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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
SECURITY DILEMMAS IN 
MULTIETHNIC STATES 
NEDZAD BASIC' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of the fact that many scholars have contributed to the discourse 
on the legal relationship between international legal principles of self-
determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states, the question 
as to why and how disputes between these two principles, associated with 
principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the 
international recognition of states, can encourage sub-national groups and a 
central government (neither of which necessarily wishes to trigger violent 
confrontation) to make a rational choice that, in conjunction with the 
other's choice, leads to armed conflict, remains controversial.' 
* Associate Professor of International Law and International Relations, University in Bihac, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author wishes to thank the University in Bihac, St. Thomas University, 
University of New Brunswick, Research Support Scheme, Senate of Canada and Fulbright Scholars 
Program for supporting this research project. 
I. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-determination and International Law, 7 
WIS. INT'L L.J. 51 (1988); Allen Buchanan, Self-determination and the Right to Secede, 45 J. INT'L 
AFF. 347 (Winter 1992); Allen Buchanan, Toward a Theory oj Secession , 1991 ETHICS WI; ALLAN 
BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO 
LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (Westview Press 1991); LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY 
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 18-25 (Yale University Press 1978); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-
Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); ANTONIO CASSESE, 
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (Cambridge University Press 1995); Herb Feith & Alan Smith, 
Self-determination in the 1990s: Equipping the UN to Resolve Ethno-Nationalist Conflict, in 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 143-161 (Kumar Rupesinghe ed., 1994); JOHN HARRIS ED., THE 
POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1995); Alexis Heraclides, Secession, Self-
Determination, and Nonintervention, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 399 (Winter 1992); STANLEY HOFFMAN, THE 
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This paper considers how the international legal system may be 
reconstructed through the introduction of new legal relationships among 
these principles of international law to encourage different ethnic and 
religious communities, which rely on the principle of self-determination, 
and central governments, which invokes the principle of territorial 
integrity of its state, to make rational choices that will reduce the 
likelihood of minority/government conflict in the future. Sub-national 
groups understand self-determination of peoples to include the right of 
secession/ which threatens the territorial integrity of a state, while the 
territorial integrity of a state prohibits self-determination to be 
understood as statehood.3 Since the principles of international law, self-
determination of peoples and integrity of states have equal international 
status,4 this creates legal confusion in political relations, and constrains 
ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Univ. of Notre Dame Press); MarUi 
Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 
INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 241 (1994); Ruth Lapidoth, Sovereignty in Transition, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 325 
(Winter 1992); Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination, 47 
INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 537 (1998); MARGARET MOORE ED., NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND 
SECESSION (Oxford University Press 1998); REIN MULLERSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw, RIGHTS AND 
POLITICS: DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 58-105 (Routledge 1994); ROBERT 
PHILLIPS & DUANE CADY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers); L. 
Wildhaber, Territorial Modification and Breakups in Federal States, 1995 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 41. 
2. Article I of both the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights states that all peoples have the right to 
self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. See W. Fuatey-Kodjoe, Self-determination, 
in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 385 (Schachter & Joyner eds., 1994); Ian Brownlie, The Rights 
of Peoples in Modem Inu:mational Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 1-16 (1. Crawford ed., 
Clarendon Press 1988); Ruth Lapidoth, Sovereignty in Transition, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 325 (Winter 
1992). 
3. The U. N. General Assembly Declaration of 1970 on Friendly Relations states: "Nothing 
in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. Every State 
shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of any other State or country." G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. 
(No. 28), U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1970). 
4. Article (1) UN Charter establishes the principles and purposes of the UN. Paragraphs (I) 
and (2) of the Article state two of the principal purposes of the UN: to maintain international peace 
and security and to develop friendly relations among nations. Both purposes must be based on the 
principles of "equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
protects the territorial integrity of any state from the threat or use of force as art absolute and general 
principle of international law. Paragraph I of the same Article recognizes the sovereign equality of 
all members. In other words, the territorial basis of sovereignty is guaranteed. The final paragraph, 
(7), then extends this guarantee in its prohibition on the United Nations, except for enforcement 
measures under Chapter Vll, against interference within the jurisdiction of the sovereign state over 
its territory. See generally, Kathryn Eliot, The New Worlds Order and the Right of Self-Defence in 
the United Nations Charter, 15 HAST. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 55 (1991); Thomas D. Grant, 
Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305 (1997); c. Schreuer, The 
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participants, ethnic groups, and central governments from focusing on 
primary goals: secession and protection of states' territorial integrity. 
In a typical dispute between ethnic groups and a central government, 
each claims one principle to justify its position and to regulate the 
outcome of the dispute. Rather than contribute to peace, the original 
intention of each, the two principles intensify internal conflict. The 
conflict between these international legal principles often tends to 
promote and legalize internal armed conflict and violence. 
The international community must remain aloof from these internal 
disputes within states until they threaten international peace. 
"International law prohibits intervention, in the sense of coercion against 
a state - or to use political science parlance attempts to alter 'the 
authority structure' of a state - except in exceptional circumstances, such 
as in case of self-defense or intervention pursuant to a U. N. or regional 
IGO decision. Humanitarian intervention has not been universally 
accepted as a justifiable pretext for the use of force, and concern for 
human rights violations - which by today's standards can not be 
structured as interference - is not considered a legitimate platform for 
coercive intervention. "5 In such legal situations, the principle of 
"humanitarian intervention" is associated with international peace, that 
is, absence of armed conflict between sovereign states. In the 
relationship between these norms of international law, human rights loses 
an active role in the process of internal democratization of states and 
peace-building in the current international order.6 
The solution presented in this paper includes the corollary that a 
modification to the existing relationship among principles of 
Winning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law, 1993 EUR. I. 
INT'LL. 447. 
5. Alexis Heraclides, Secession, Self-determination and Intervention, 45 I. INT'L AFF. 399, 
402 (Winter 1992). See also, Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human 
Rights, 69 I. INT'L AFF. 429 (1993); Stephen Salarz & Michael O'Hanlon, Humanitarian 
Intervention: When Is Force Justified?, 1997 WASH. Q. 3; Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A 
Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT'L L.l. 341 (1995); M.E. 
O'Connell, Commentary on International Law: Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 
67 IND. L.l. 903 (1992); 1.A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: 
A Reappraisal in light of a Changing World Order, 881 AM. U. 1. INT'L POL'y 890 (1992); 1. Delbruck, 
Commentary on International Law: A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of 
the United Nations, 67 IND. L.1. 887 (1992). 
6. Elsa Stamatopoulou, The Development of United Nations Mechanism for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights, 1998 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687; Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-
Life Crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1998 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781; 
Geoffrey Best, Justice, International Relations and Human Rig/us, 71 INT'L AFF. 775 (1995). 
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international law will affect how the parties to a dispute can avoid mutual 
armed conflict, and how the international community can obtain an 
active role in the prevention of internal armed conflict and internal 
democratization of a state. 
Consequently, if this relationship can be modified, it will encourage the 
parties to make decisions that will lead to democratization. In a new 
relationship between these principles of international law, the principles 
of self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of states coexist 
with principles of human rights, peace and development.7 Through this 
change in the international legal system, the principles of non-
intervention of the international community in the internal affairs of 
states and of international recognition of states, are inherently associated 
with principles of human rights, making the doctrine of human rights an 
effective tool of internal democratization of states and of peace-building. 
The logical implications and the intended political results of these 
changes are that internal peace is no longer associated with either of the 
competing principles of self-determination of peoples or territorial 
integrity of states. Instead, peace becomes associated with the principles 
of respect for human rights, development, and democracy. This change 
requires a new definition of international peace, one that is no longer 
associated with threats to interstate relationships, but rather to threats to 
human rights and democratization. 
II. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AMBIGUITY 
The legal relationship between principles of self-detennination of a people 
and the territorial integrity of a state is one of the most complex questions 
in the area of internationallaw.8 
7. Despite the philosophical arguments concerning the relationship between self-
detennination and sovereignty of states, many commentators tend to justify secession in tenns of 
respect for individual human rights and a remedy for injustice. However, they entirely ignore how 
the legal relationship between these principles can be a powerful tool for the internal 
democratization of a state and the respect for human rights as a basis of societal development. 
''There is a tendency to view these two profound political changes - the spread of democracy and the 
surge of secessionist movements - as distinct and unrelated phenomena. The scholarly literature 
tends to concentrate on the one or the other, without attempting to provide a systematic analysis that 
links the two." Allen Buchanan, Denwcracy and Secession. in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND SECESSION 15 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998). 
8. The principle of self-determination of a people was first enunciated in Lenin's Theses on 
the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Detennination. In these theses three 
components of these principles were emphasized: the right of ethnic or national groups to freely 
4
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The issue of this relationship in international law is often reduced to one of 
diffusion of power between a central government and sub-national groups," 
but, unfortunately, without emphasis on the internal democratization of 
states. 10 
The UN Charter and other UN documents leave many crucial questions 
open on this issue, which, in conjunction with principles of recognition of 
states and non-intervention in internal affairs of states, create many 
problems in contemporary internal and international political relations. 
Article (1) of the UN Charter establishes the principles and purposes of the 
international community. Article 1 (1) states that one of the purposes of the 
UN is "to maintain international peace and security." Paragraph (2) of 
Article 1 states as another purpose to develop "friendly relations among 
nations." This purpose is based on the principle of "self-determination of 
peoples." The Preamble of the Charter of the UN has previously related 
these two purposes to an obligation of member states to "live together in 
peace with one another as good neighbours" while prohibition of the threat 
or use offorce has been emphasized in Article 2 (4) ofthe UN Charter." 
detennine their own destiny, the prohibition of territorial annexation against the will of the people, 
and the liberation of all colonial countries. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLE 
14-18 (1995). 
9. "In a case of diffusion of power, both the central government and the regional or 
autonomous authorities could be the lawful bearer of a share of sovereignty, without necessarily 
leading to the disappearance or dismemberment of the state." R. Lapidoth, Sovereignty in 
Transition, 45 1. INT'L AFF. 325, 345 (Winter 1992). 
10. "Secessionist attempts, and the efforts of states to resist them, have usually led to severe 
economic dislocation and massive violations of human rights. All too often, ethnic minorities have 
won their independence only to subject their own minorities to the same persecutions they formerly 
suffered." Buchanan, supra note 7, at 14. 
11. Article (I) of the UN Charter states that preservation of peace is the main goal of the UN. With 
regard to this goal, the UN Charter has set forth measures and procedures for UN activities in case of a 
threat to peace. 
(a) Charter prohibition on the use of force: The UN Charter includes the commitment of all 
countries to use their armed forces solely in the common interest of the international community, to 
resolve disputes by peaceful means and without the threat of the use of force, or the use of force 
against the territorial integrity and political independence, which protected the principle of the 
"sovereign equality" of states as a principle of the legal system of the Charter, banning all forceful 
settlements of conflicts. The ban of the use of force or the threat of the use of force became one of 
the fundamental norms of international law. 
(b) Charter guaranteed right of self -defence: The UN Charter goes further than simply 
forbidding the use of force. In Article 2, Para. 4 of the Charter the use of force or the threat of the 
use of force is forbidden in any form and Para. 6 of this Article stresses that even non-UN members 
must act in line with this principle, which gives it a universal meaning. In a bid to eliminate the right 
to use force in international relations without at the same time reducing the natural right to 
individual or collective self-defense of states, the Charter confirms in Article 51 the right of states to 
self-defense only in cases of armed attack and until the UN Security Council undertakes measures to 
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Article 55 of the UN Charter uses the same language as does Article 1 (2), 
and adds to it an argument about how to realize the principle of "self-
determination of peoples." It seeks to create "conditions of stability and 
well-being" that are necessary to the realization of the purpose of "friendly 
relations among nations" based on the principle of "self-determination of 
peoples." 
The meaning and significance of "self-determination of peoples" have 
become more significant and complex. With the beginning of the post-
Cold War period, the international community faced the problem of 
implementing simultaneously and with reference to the same state the 
principles of "self-determination of peoples" and respect for "the territorial 
integrity and political independence of any state." 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects the territorial integrity of any state 
from the threat or use of force as an absolute and general principle of 
international law. Paragraph (1) of the same Article recognizes the 
sovereign equality of all members.12 In other words, the territorial basis of 
sovereignty is guaranteed. The [mal paragraph (7) of the same Article 
extends this guarantee in its prohibition on the international community, 
except for enforcement measures under Chapter VII, against interference 
within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state over its territory. 13 
The General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
provides that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression,"'4 while 
maintain international peace and security. S.G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral 
HUl1Ul1litarian Intervention, 24 CAL. W.lNT'LL.J. 117, 126 (1994). 
12. "All states enjoy sovereign equality including the following elements: a) States are 
judicially equal, b) Each enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty, c) Each State has the duty to 
respect the personality of other States, d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the 
state are inviolable, e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, 
economic, and cultural systems, f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its 
international obligations and to leave in peace with other States." G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Supp. (No. 28), at 76, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970). 
13. "No State or group of the States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State, Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other fonns of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law." 
Declaration on Principles of International Law, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. (No. 
28), U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970); see also Oran R. Young, Intervention and International Systems, 2 J. 
lNT'L AFF. 22 (Summer 1968); JOHN NORTON MOORE ED., LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (John Hopkins University Press 1974). 
14. "No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other fonns 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state, or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are condemned." G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. 
(No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1971). 
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U.N. G.A. Resolution 36/103 provides a detailed fonnulation of the 
principle of non-intervention.15 
By adopting U.N. G.A. Declaration 2625 (XXV), which reaffInned that "no 
state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type 
of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it 
advantages of any kind," prohibition of intervention has clearly been 
reaffInned as a positive nonn of internationallaw.16 This makes conflict 
over territory an international legal question since a claim to secession as a 
matter of self-determination conflicts with another, equal principle of 
international law, the territorial integrity of a state, also inseparable from a 
land base and jurisdiction over the land base. 
Since the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference halt the 
influence of self-determination at the borders of a state, this legal conflict 
becomes much more complex, despite the strong regard given in 
international law to preserving the territorial integrity of a state. One of the 
practical repercussions of this controversial relationship between principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention is that human rights remain without 
effectual international protection in the case of a conflict between principles 
of self-determination of a people and the territorial integrity of a state. l ? In 
this circumstance, both the central government of a sovereign state and a 
group moving toward self-determination may decide to settle their claims 
by resorting to armed hostilities. 
15. "(a) The duty of states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any form ... disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other states, to overthrow or 
change the political system of another state or its Government; (b) The duty of states to ensure that is 
territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, 
territorial integrity and national unity, or disrupt the political, economic, and social stability of 
another state; (c) The duty of states to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military 
occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed to another 
state or group states; (f) The duty of states to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, 
direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within other states, under any pretext 
whatsoever, or any action which seems to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political 
order of other countries; (g) The duty of states to refrain from any economic, political or military 
activity in the territory of another state without its consent." G.A. Res. 361103, U.N. GAOR, 36th 
Sess., 91st plenary meeting (1981) available at http://www.un.orgldocumentslgalres/36/a36r103. 
16. Martin Griffiths, lain Levine and Mark Weller, Sovereignty and Suffering, in THE 
POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 40 (John Harrison ed., 1995). 
17. "Offences against human rights are a matter of international concern, but they do not 
trigger intervention except perhaps when outrageous conduct shocks the conscience of mankind." 
Adam Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69 INT'L AFF. 429, 
433 (1993). 
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A. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A RIGHT OF SECESSION 
In this circumstance the meaning of the principle of self-determination and 
its relation to the principle of territorial integrity of a state becomes one of 
the most intricate questions in international law. It has provoked intense 
scholarly debate, for no other legal question has as much influence on 
internal and international political relations. 
Some scholars understand self-determination to be the central issue of the 
globalization of democracy. For this group of scholars, self-determination 
means liberty and the free development of all peoples that justify the right 
to independent statehood. IS They argue that the Article 1(2) principle of 
"self-determination of peoples" is an absolute legal principle whose 
purpose is to strengthen international peace. They contend that all other 
norms and rules in the UN Charter must harmonize with its absolute 
principles. Thus, the principle of Article 1(2) includes all "peoples" and 
overrides the understanding that "peoples" reside exclusively in colonial or 
trust territories and that a "people" coincides with existing international 
borders of colonies or trust territories. 
In accordance with this opinion, the right of a people to self-determination 
means the right to establish a state or to choose the state to which the people 
wish to belong, and the right to the free choice of government. As van 
Praag recently defined it, ''This means that the right of self-determination is 
a right of choice, emphasizing once again its inextricable link to the core 
notion of democracy. One choice could be political independence, but 
there are many other choices, both political and social, cultural or economic 
which a people can make."19 
However, within this school of opinion there are significant differences 
regarding valid claims to secession. In accordance with a historical-
territorial approach, justification for secession might be found in the 
existence of a historical claim for a particular piece of land. L. Brilmayer 
emphasizes that "Separatist movements cannot be understood or 
evaluated without reference to claims to territory. Groups do not seek to 
secede merely because they are ethnically distinct, and if they did, they 
would probably not get much support. It is hard even to understand what 
18. D. Copp, Democracy and Communal Self-Determination, in THE MORALITY OF 
NATIONALISM (McMahan and McKim eds., Oxford University Press 1997); D. Philpott, In Defence 
of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 352 (1995). 
19. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, Self-Determination in a World Conflict - A Source of 
Instability or Instrument of Peace?, in REFLECTIONS ON PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (Gill and Heere eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000). 
8
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 8 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol8/iss1/2
2002] INT'L LAW & SECURITY IN MULTIETHNIC STATES 9 
a separatist group would demand absent historical claim to territory. 
When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a right to a particular piece 
of land, and one must necessarily inquire into why it is entitled to that 
particular piece of land, as opposed to some other piece of land - or to no 
land at all. "20 
Other groups of scholars find the historical-territorial approach 
controversial and too rigid to include the right to secession.21 In their 
opinion, the so-called Human Rights Approach, the right of self-
determination is a human right that should be applied to all situations where 
people are subject to oppression by subjugation, domination, and 
exploitation by others.22 
The third stream in this academic view is the most liberal in regard to 
justification of a claim to a right of secession. This academic opinion 
recognizes the theoretical correctness of historical-territorial and human 
rights approaches to justify a claim of secession. However, scholars of this 
theoretical concept emphasize cases in which secession should be justified 
even if there has been no oppression by SUbjugation, domination, or 
exploitation, or in the absence of a justified historical claim to territory. 
The central point of this opinion is that secession can be justified if sub-
national groups can show that they are victims of "discriminatory 
redistribution" at the hands of a state and that they cannot "preserve their 
distinctive culture ... even if it is no longer the case that they are victims of 
discrimination or other injustice."23 
20. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. 
lNT'LL. 177, 199 (1991). 
21. ''The standard account pits the principle of self-determination against the principle of 
territorial integrity. The first assumes government is defined as a collection of individuals; the latter, 
as an area of land. Defining government in terms of land better explains what secessionists are 
trying to accomplish. When individuals seek to secede, they are making a claim to territory. They 
wish a piece of land for their future, a piece of land on which they will be able to make their own 
claims of integrity of territorial borders. Their claim is typically centered on a piece of land that they 
possessed in the past, and upon which they claimed territorial integrity. Territorial integrity properly 
understood accommodations the principle of self-determination. Whatever conflict exists is not 
between principles, but over land." Id. 
22. "After the recognition by the international community of disintegration as unitary States of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it could now be the case that any government which is oppressive 
to peoples within its territory may no longer be able to rely on the general interest of territorial 
integrity as a limitation on the right of self-determination. It appears that only a government of a 
State which allows all its people to decide freely their political status and economic, social and 
cultural development has an interest of territorial integrity which can possibly limit the exercise of 
the right of self-determination." Robert McCorquodale, Self-determination: A Human Rights 
Approach, 43 lNT'L & COMPo L.Q. 857, 880 (1994). 
23. "Perhaps the most compelling of these, and the one that is most often applicable in actual 
cases of secession, is for the secessionists to show that they are victims of 'discriminatory 
9
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This group of scholars holds that the principle of self-determination of a 
people has general application and support in UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) resolutions and other international legal instruments. 
The Third Committee Working Group on the Final Draft of the Human 
Rights Covenant declared in 1955 that the "UN had used the word 
'peoples' in a broad sense, that is to say, to include nations and ethnic 
groupS."24 
In Res. 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960 and Res. 1803 (XVII), the UN 
General Assembly went a step further in referring to self-determination as a 
right. Further, by defining its opposite, the subjection of a people, it 
identified the denial of the right, thus preparing the ground for evaluation of 
several government policies. Already regarded as an absolute and general 
principle of international law, it raised a claim to self-determination to the 
status of a claim to a right. Seen in the context of other General Assembly 
resolutions, it defines self-determination as a right to be realized through 
independence and self-government. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, drafted at the same 
time as the Declaration, affirmed the position taken in the Declaration. 
Article (1) of both Covenants states: 
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of the 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social, and cultural development.25 
Some scholars argue that the formulation of self-determination m the 
Covenants has made it ajus cogens norm of internationallaw.26 
redistribution' at the hands of the state. A state engages in discriminatory redistribution whenever it 
implements taxation schemes, regulatory policies or economic programs that systematically work to 
the disadvantage of some groups while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways. A clear 
example would be a government imposing higher taxes on one group while spending less on it or 
placing special economic restrictions on the region the group occupies, without any sound moral 
justification for this unequal treatment. In this sense, a moral theory of the right to secede depends 
upon the theory of distributive justice. Different theories of distributive justice may yield different 
answers to the question of whether a certain pattern of redistribution counts as discriminatory 
redistribution and thus can serve as a sound basis for claiming the right to secede." Allen Buchanan, 
Self-determination and the Right to Secede, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 347, 354 (1992); see also DONALD A. 
HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (University California Press 1985). 
24. M.H. HALPERIN AND OJ. SCHEFFER, SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 11-
17 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1992). 
25. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. (No. 31), at 142, U.N. Doc. N963 (1974). 
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The General Assembly subsequently began to read the meaning of self-
determination as contained within the context of decolonization in Article 
1(2). Self-determination as a right to self-government and independence 
for all people came to be understood as the principle of "self-determination 
of peoples," whose pursuit would realize the purpose of the development of 
"friendly relations among nations." Thus, by 1970, the interpretation had 
come full circle to where it began in 1945, but with a significant new 
dimension. The resolution on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states not only makes the 
above associations, but also adds language from Article 55-56 as to how 
member states should act in order to achieve UN purposes. By then, 
however, the purposes referred to in Article 56 were not the development of 
friendly relations among states, but the realization of the right of all peoples 
"freely to determine, without external influence, their political status.''27 
By the time of the Helsinki Final Act, the signatories had fully accepted the 
UN General Assembly formulation. They expressed and confirmed their 
full respect for the equal right of peoples and their right to self-
determination, which allowed all people(s) in full freedom "to determine, 
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without 
external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, 
social and cultural development."28 
Universal recognition of the right to self-determination was unanimously 
reaffirmed in the fmal Declaration and Programme of Action which was 
adopted at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in June 
1993.29 
However, the question of which groups qualify for self-determination 
creates problems in this theoretical view. Namely, in this interpretation 
only "people" have a right to self-determination, while ethnic groups do 
not. The lack of a clear definition of the notion of people, and the 
difficulty in drawing a distinction between people and ethnic groups 
introduces an element of subjectivity into the recognition of a right to 
self-determination, which often leads to a double standard in the 
recognition of the right of self-determination in specific cases. 30 
26. Cassese, supra note 8, at 133-40. 
27. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. (No. 17), at 66, U.N. Doc. N5217 (1970). 
28. Helsinki Final Act, art. 8, para. I(a), 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). 
29. Vienna Declaration and Programme of ActiOI!, G.A. Conf. 157/23, UN Department of 
Public Information, New York, 1993. 
30. Lapidoth, supra note 9, at 338. 
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"The term 'peoples' is used in a different sense in Chapters XI and XII of 
the Charter. Chapter XI is concerned with Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (NSGTs '). Article 73 provides that member States which 
administer NSGTs will, inter alia, "develop self-government, to take due 
account of the political aspirations of the peoples." Article 73 uses the 
term "peoples" to refer to the inhabitants of NSGTs. These territories are 
defined as 'territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure 
of self-government. Consequently, there is uncertainty over the identity 
of the peoples referred to in Article 73."31 
A definition of the term "people" developed by a committee of experts 
mandated by UNESCO made this situation clearer but did not dispel 
controversy. The Committee defined 'people' as a group of individuals 
who enjoy some or all of the following common features: a common 
history, racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, 
religious or ideological affinity, territorial connection and a common 
economic life.32 
With this definition, the international community adopts a purely 
territorial and personal concept of people. As Quane has postulated, 
"Recent events in Eastern Europe might suggest that it also applies to the 
highest constituent units of federal States in the process of dissolution 
but this is unlikely given the very limited and equivocal nature of State 
practice on this issue. Attempts to define people on the basis of personal 
criteria such as ethnicity or language have been unsuccessful and the 
international community has consistently denied a legal right to self-
determination for ethnic, linguistic and religious groups within State."33 
With this double approach to the definition of people, the principle of 
self-determination becomes more a political than a legal issue. 
B. SELF-DETERMINATION AS SELF-GOVERNANCE 
Another group of scholars argues that this approach to self-determination is 
fraught with practical problems.34 These international lawyers argue that 
31. Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-determination, 47 INT'L 
& COMPo L.Q. 537, 540 (1998). 
32. UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights 
of Peoples: Final Reports and Recommendations (1990). 
33. Quane, supra note 31, at 571. 
34. "The more I think about the President's (Wilson's) declaration as to the right of self-
determination, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain 
races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in 
many lands. Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded with 
dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realised. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the 
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within states, self-detennination does not go as far as independence, as it 
did for colonies and trust territories. Self-detennination requires no 
independent territory to govern.35 
These scholars argue that the UN Charter recognizes self -detennination as a 
right of self-governance but not as a right of a people to possess its own 
territory for an independent state. In this view, there is no conflict between 
the principle of self -detennination of a people and the principle of territorial 
integrity, since self-governance does not require a people to "own" the 
territory it governs; it can remain the state's.36 The principle of self-
detennination was accepted only insofar as it implied a right to self-
government of a people and not a right to secession. Thus, as long ago as 
1945, the territorial integrity of states, which has acquired enormous 
importance in recent years, was held to be paramount. 
This view has pointed specifically to Articles 1(2), 73 and 76. One scholar 
has noted: ''Taken together, therefore, Articles 1(2), 73 and 76 clearly set 
out the meaning of self -detennination as it is expressed in the Charter: 
"Peoples" in Article 1 (2) refers to all distinct groups, such as "nations", and 
the right to self-detennination is intended to mean the right to self-
government. In practical terms, the objective of invoking this right would 
be to apply it to "peoples" who were not self-governing at the time, either 
because they had been deprived of self-government or because they were 
not yet able to exercise self-governance. Acquiring self-government 
through total independence was considered a possibility for a special 
category of peoples, namely the inhabitants, of UN Trust Territories."37 
A state's practice also tends to deny people the right to secede. As 
remarked by Quane, "During the decolonization period a legal right of 
self-determination emerged for colonial people. For these peoples, self-
end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until 
too late to check those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever 
uttered! What misery it will cause!" ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSONAL 
NARRATIVE 97-8 (Houghton Muftlin Company 1921). See also Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of Self-
determination, 89 FOR. POL'y 21 (Winter 1992-93). 
35. This opinion is predominantly represented by a liberal view of national issues. See 
discussion in E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780, PROGRAMME, MYTH, 
REALITY (1990); see also HURST HANNUM, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (University of Pennsylvania Press 1990), and MICHLA 
POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE (Nijhof 1982). 
36. Hector Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations 
Resolutions {Relating to the Right of Peoples Under Colonial and Alien Domination}, U.N. Doc. 
ElCN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1 (1980), para. 90. 
37. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Self-determination, in I UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 385 
(Schachter & Joyner eds., 1994). 
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determination meant the right to independence or any other international 
status. The development of this legal right to self-determination 
represents a further stage in the general evaluation of the principle. 
However, attempts to apply this right outside the colonial context are 
futile. It is clear from State practice during this unique historical period 
that the right was only ever intended to apply to colonial peoples. 
Attempts to overextend the principle simply generate confusion and 
possibly create or reinforce unrealistic expectations among groups of 
non-colonial peoples whose claim to self-determination will not be 
recognised by the United Nations."38 
These international lawyers do not believe that recent cases regarding 
decomposition of old and composition of new states in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union raise the issue of a right of secession. They find 
the legal basis for recognition of successor states of the former Soviet 
Union and the former Yugoslavia in the restoration of independence, in an 
agreement between a successor state and the predecessor state, and in 
internal dissolution of a state.39 
Although the international community l~ not inclined to recognize the 
practice or legality of secession, large numbers of people desire separation. 
Many states' self-determination movements have found justification for 
secession in the norms of international law, despite their ambiguity and 
controversial nature.40 
Although both self-determination and territorial integrity are general and 
absolute principles of international law, the conflict in their relationship has 
developed rather quickly and perhaps unexpectedly. Consequently, the 
conflict in the relationship between these two legal norms results in 
unavoidable internal political conflict. At present, it allows only a political, 
and usually a violent, solution. The international community has neither 
38. Quane, supra note 31, at 558. 
39. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relations to Unilateral 
Secession, report to the Supreme Court of Canada, no. 25505 (1996); S. Blay, A Reassessment in the 
Post-Communist Era, 22 J. INT'L LAW & POL'y 275, 292-93 (1994). 
40. "State practice during the decolonisation period consistently affirmed the right of peoples 
everywhere to self-determination. This led to the mistaken belief that the principle was intended to 
be universally applicable. When groups in non-colonial States unsuccessfully invoked the right, the 
international community was accused of double standards and the existence of a legal right to self-
determination was denied on the grounds of this perceived inconsistency. However, when many 
States affirmed the right of peoples everywhere to self-determination they did not intend to affirm 
the universality of the right as a commonly understood. For them, peoples in independent States had 
already exercised the right to self-determination. By affirming the universality of the right, they 
were seeking to extend its application to peoples who had not yet exercised it." Quane, supra note 
31, at 571. 
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managed to establish nonns to resolve the conflict between self-
determination of a people and the territorial integrity of a state, nor has it 
managed to settle outstanding disputes between sub-national groups and 
majority governments that threaten each other with annihilation. 
However, the United Nations is moving away from its rigid anti-secession 
position, as evidenced in the recognition of the numerous Eastern European 
states that have seceded from the fonner Soviet Union." 
III. INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
The relationship between these two apparently conflicting principles of 
international law creates a great dilemma between minority groups and 
central governments that wish to maximize their gains. In these 
circumstances it is difficult for either party to assume the other will 
cooperate, as ea~h has a competing claim. 
Moreover, relative to the principles of a people's self-determination, 
including secession, and preservation of the territorial integrity of a state, 
each side is concerned with what strategy the international community will 
apply and how this will affect its relative gains.42 Because of this ambiguity 
in the contemporary international legal order, the key to solving the 
dilemma between a central government and a sub-national group lies in the 
relationship among international legal norms, rather than in a political 
relationship between the participants. 
In light of the contemporary international legal system, a central 
government postulates that the international community will recognize its 
right to protect the territorial integrity of the sovereign state. The UN 
Charter particularly prohibits attack on states. Self-defense against 
armed attack is spelled out in Article 51 as a fundamental right of states. 
"All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state."43 
41. The European Community's recognition policy is set out in the declaration of December 
16, 1991, in guidelines for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
I.L.M. (1992),1486. 
42. See more about relative gains and co-operation in Grico Joseph, Anarchy and the Limits of 
Co-operation, International Organisations, 42:885-507. 
43. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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Article 53(1) of the UN Charter emphasizes that no enforcement action 
shall be taken without authorization of the UN Security Council. The 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States says that 
any form of unilateral intervention in a state is a violation of international 
law. The Declaration calls on states to abstain from any form of 
compulsion against the territorial integrity and independence of a state.44 
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention says that threatening 
the economic or cultural elements of a state, encouraging any type of 
coercion to subordinate a state's sovereign rights, or inviting or tolerating 
terrorist or armed activities directed at the violent overthrow of a 
government, must be considered an illegal intervention.45 
Further, contemporary international law provides no norm as to the clear 
obligation of a state to refrain from the use of force against sub-national 
groups claiming secession. There is no clear norm of international law that 
allows the international community to use force against a state employing 
force against rebels under its jurisdiction. Employment of force in internal 
relations remains exclusively under the internal jurisdiction of a state. 
Central governments might postulate that the international community 
would not intervene in its internal affairs, since international law prohibits 
external intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. The 
famous Article 2(7) of the UN Charter declares that "nothing contained 
in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." Since Chapter VII is 
entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression," it is obvious that just threats to the 
international peace, breaches of the international peace and acts of 
aggression, can be legal reason for UN intervention in matters which are 
essentially within domestic jurisdiction. . Taking threats and breaches of 
international peace as reasons for intervention in internal affairs of states, 
international law largely excludes internal situations in states as a reason for 
44. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States. G.A. Res. 2525, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970). 
45. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
N60l4 (1965). 
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outside intervention.46 ''The Security Council may take action only to 
maintain international peace and security. Moreover, the Council must 
avoid interfering in internal affairs of member states by altering a state's 
political arrangements."47 
Bearing in mind that international law deals with crimes against 
international peace, defined in the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice as planning, preparing, inciting or undertaking a war of aggression 
or a war undertaken through a violation of international agreements, treaties 
or assurances, or as participation in a joint plan or plot for the undertaking 
of any of the above, it is difficult to predict that the international 
community would view even the most drastic violations of human rights 
and freedoms occurring within states as threats to or breaches of 
international peace. In fact, many scholars believe that Article 2(7) and 
Article 39 of the UN Charter should be read in light of the non-
interventionist stipulation in Article 2(7). In such situations, the 
international community is inclined to view human rights as matters within 
a state's domestic jurisdiction.48 
A central government might speculate that decentralization of a state with a 
high level of autonomy could encourage sub-national groups to seek 
secession that could be recognized by the international community as an 
internal dissolution of a state. Luzius Wildhaber remarks that "Precisely 
because minorities may enjoy autonomy as the member units of a federal 
state and because they can articulate their claims and build up their 
political elite and administrative infrastructure, secession is easier for 
them to effectuate than it would be in centralist or dictatorial regimes. 
46. In the Preamble to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, which is approved by G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970), the words "the practice of any 
form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the 
creation of situations which threaten international peace and security ... " are particularly emphasized. 
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. N9631 (1974), defined 
aggression as the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the territory of another state, or 
any military occupation, however temporarily, resulting from such invasion or attack. By adopting 
this definition of aggression, UNGA has reduced unilateral intervention on aggression. In the same 
Resolution, Article 3(a), the UN Security Council is given discretion to conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in light of other 
relevant circumstances. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. (No. 31), U.N. 
Doc. N9631 (1974). See also B.F. Burmester, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order 
and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAHL. REv. 269,278. 
47. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Commentary on International Law: Continuing Limits on UN 
Intervention in Civil War, 67lNo. LJ. 903, 904-5 (1992). 
48. "As important as human rights are to international peace and security, they do not override the 
fundamental interest in state sovereignty, as long as the violation does not directly affect affairs in other 
states" Yoshiko Inoue, United Nations' Peace-keeping Role in the Post-Cold War Era: The Conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 LoY. L.A.lNT'L & COMPo LJ. 264 (1994). 
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Respect for minorities, which is inherent in genuine federalism, 
simplifies not only cohabitation but also the breaking apart. If one also 
claims - like the Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace in 
Yugoslavia - that the borderlines between federal member units must be 
inviolable, one would seem to be punishing federal states for their 
respect for minorities and, as institutions, treating them worse then 
unitary states are treated."49 Such a situation could encourage central 
governments to employ a policy of centralization. 
At the same time, minority groups might speculate that the international 
community would support their right to self-determination. Some 
movements toward self-determination find justification for their claim to 
secession in discriminatory redistribution, in preservation of their 
distinctive culture, or in their right to reclaim legitimate title to the 
territory that was unjustly annexed by the state from their indisputable 
descendants. 50 
Moreover, in the context of the contemporary international legal system, 
it is difficult to provide evidence of a discriminatory or non-
,discriminatory policy, economic redistribution, or non-preservation of a 
distinctive culture of a sub-national group. Even if a central government 
accepts a sub-national group's objections and improves its regulatory 
policies or economic programs to preserve its distinctive culture, there is 
no guarantee that the sub-national group would desist from claiming a 
right to secession. Nor is there any guarantee that the sub-national group 
would cooperate with the central government with the aim of improving 
its own political, economic and cultural position. Since "discriminatory 
redistribution" appears to be a moral basis for justification of its claim 
for secession, this might encourage the sub-national group to display its 
own position as worse than it is, or create reluctance in the group to 
cooperate with the central government to better its position. In such a 
situation, it is difficult to anticipate cooperation between a central 
government and a sub-national group. Logically, in the current 
international legal order, if sub-national groups cooperate with central 
governments that could mean that sub-national groups are decreasing 
their opportunities to be separated from the state, which is not in their 
self-interest. On the other hand, if central governments cooperate with 
sub-national groups and allow them a high level of autonomy, that could 
be dangerous for the territorial integrity of the state. In a situation in 
49. Luzius Wildhaber, Tern'torial Modifications and Breakups in Federal States, 33 CAN. Y.B. 
INT'L L. 41, at 43 (1995). 
50. See A. Buchanan, Self-detennination and the Right to Secede, 45 I.INT'L AFF. 353 (1992). 
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which self-determination and protection of the territorial integrity of the 
state are legal claims for both but mutually exclusive of each other, there 
is no perspective for cooperation between a sub-national group and the 
central government. 
Sub-national groups might also postulate that some states would recognize 
their right to secede,s' and that the international community might intervene 
in the internal affairs of the state in case of internal armed conflict and great 
humanitarian crisis,s2 thereby supporting their right to secede. Sub-national 
groups that rely on international intervention know that the creation of a 
human disaster within a state might provoke military intervention from 
outside,s3 which could encourage them to provoke or intensify inter-
communal conflict. 54 
Sub-national groups might also speculate that the centralization of a state 
would encourage the international community to refuse to recognize their 
right to self-determination, and so justify a high level of constitutional, 
political and administrative centralization of a state. As a result, a sub-
national group would lose its cultural and historical identity, its political 
independence, and its economic influence in a common state. This might 
51. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 87-106 (4th ed. 1995); 
David O. Lloyd, Succession, Secession, and State Membership in the United Nations, 26 J. INT'L L. 
& POL. 784 (Summer 1994). 
52. See Tom J. Farer, Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the 
First Phases, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 15 (1996). 
53. See more about justification of external military intervention with an aim to end 
suppression within state and to protect refugees and other inhabitants in Adam Roberts, 
Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69 INT'L AFF. 434 (1993). 
Also, many international lawyers are inclined to see a legal basis for intervention of the 
international community in the internal affairs of state in the case "when government is acting in a 
tyrannical manner its population, in the aim protect minorities from genocide or violent oppression, 
combat gross and persistent violation of human rights, and act to protect extreme cases of violence 
against a people." J.A. Gallant, Humanitarian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A 
Reappraisal in Light of a Changing World Order, 1992 AM. V.J. INT'L POL'y 881, at 890. A similar 
opinion can be seen in the statement of former UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar: "We 
are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that 
the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal 
documents." DAVID J. SCHEFFER ET AL., POST -GULF WAR CHALLENGES TO THE V.N. COLLECTIVE 
SECURITY SYSTEM: THREE VIEWS ON THE IsSUE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 4 (Vnited States 
Institute of Peace). 
54. "Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of the Vnited States succeeded in brokering an 
agreement with Yugoslavia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, which permitted the return of those 
who had fled their homes and the positing of a group of 2000 unarmed human rights monitors. In 
the end only 1400 monitors were deployed, but the vast majority of refugees return to their homes. 
Still it was unstable peace. According to the International Herald Tribune, 'VS intelligence reported 
almost immediately (following the Agreement) that the Kosovo rebels intended to draw NATO into 
its fight for independence by provoking Serbian force into further atrocious.' More attacks did 
occur." Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 78 (2000). 
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encourage minority groups to provoke a conflict with the central 
government and employ a strategy of secession. 
In such a circumstance the most attractive strategy for each participant is 
to pursue its own self-interest (secession or centralization), and try to 
persuade the international community to support its interest. 
Consequently, conflict will ensue. 
Even if a central government decentralizes and democratizes, no one can 
guarantee that a sub-national group would not claim a right of secession if it 
were in its own self-interest. In that case, secession could be understood in 
reference to international law as an internal dissolution of the state.55 
Nor is there any guarantee to a sub-national group that a central government 
would undertake measures of decentralization and democratization even if 
the sub-national group were to discard its claim to secession.56 
In such a circumstance, even if there is cooperation, one party might be 
concerned that the other would achieve relatively greater gains from their 
cooperation57 and that leads participants to be concerned about gaps 10 
any gains from mutual cooperation.58 
Democratization in the contemporary international legal order is thus highly 
risky, and central governments and sub-national groups have no interest in 
cooperating even if cooperation produces a better outcome for both than 
does a conflict. 
While it is clear that cooperation would result in the best possible outcome 
for both sub-national groups and central governments, it is also clear that 
the contemporary international legal order supports mutual uncertainty and 
mistrust between participants.59 This lack of mutual confidence and 
55. The Arbitration Commission of European Community in the case of Yugoslavia, in 
opinion no. I, stated that the federation of Yugoslavia was dissolving, and the federal organs were 
no longer representative. Luzius Wildhaber, Territorial Modifications and Breakups in Federal 
States, 33 CAN. Y.B INT'L L. 68 (1995); On the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia see more in 
Marc Weller, Current Developments: The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM J. lNT'L L. 569, 576 (1992). 
56. O'Connell, supra note 47. 
57. WALTZN. KENNETH, "fHEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 (1986). 
58. Joseph Grico, Relative-Gains Problem for International Co-operation, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 734 (September 1993). 
59. In this part of the article the author demonstrates how international law contributed to the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The analysis shows that strengthening international human 
rights law, and considering the rival claims of self-determination and territorial integrity in relation 
to human rights law, can prevent such conflict. 
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The Yugoslav crisis began in 1980 with the death of Josip Broz Tito, as the institutions of power 
he had brought under his control began to lose their authority. Tito had been President of the 
Communist League of Yugoslavia (CLY), President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and the Commander of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Peoples' 
Anny (YPA). After his death two strategies for solving the crisis developed. One strategy saw the 
separation of the Republics, Slovenia and Croatia in particular, and their recognition as new states as 
the main threat to the preservation of Yugoslavia. Its proponents thought the political, 
constitutional, and economic re-centralization of the state to be the most effective way to maintain 
the state. The other strategy started from the opposite viewpoint. It argued that re-centralization 
would impede political liberalization and democratization and economic realization within 
Yugoslavia, which its adherents considered to be the best way to maintain the state and to resolve the 
crisis. 
Before intervention of the international community in the Balkan conflict, two coalitions were 
participants in the conflict: the Siovenian-Croatian coalition, which demanded self-determination, 
and the Federation-Serbian coalition which focused on the territorial integrity of the former 
Yugoslavia as a unit state. Each coalition had two possible strategies: the Sloven ian-Croatian 
coalition could continue to cooperate with the Federation-Serbian coalition and seek further 
decentralization and democratization of the state, or it would seek to separate knowing its goal could 
be realized only through conflict. The Federation-Serbian coalition could continue to cooperate with 
the other coalition and negotiate for further decentralization and democratization, or it could opt for 
re-centralization of constitutional and political authority, knowing that could come only through 
conflict. Each coalition in the Yugoslav crisis faced the crucial question: given the alternatives, 
what is the rational choice? Each coalition had an interest in maximizing its self-interest and 
avoiding the conflict it knew would result if it pursued the irreconcilable policies of re-centralization 
or separation. In these circumstances, the Sloven ian-Croatian coalition had an interest in 
cooperating with the Federation-Serbian coalition conditioned on further decentralization and 
democratization of the federal state, which would open the door for its secession. In spite of its 
interest in changing the regime, the Siovenian-Croatian coalition had no confidence in the 
Federation-Serbian coalition's desire to promote decentralization and democratization in Yugoslavia. 
Furthermore, the Siovenian-Croatian coalition had no confidence that the status quo would be 
maintained and that the Federation-Serbian coalition would not attempt to re-centralize political, 
economic, and constitutional relations in a common state. 
The Federation-Serbian coalition found itself in the same position as the Siovenian-Croatian 
coalition. Were Yugoslavia to disintegrate, federal cadres and Serbia would experience catastrophic 
economic and political consequences. About two million Serbs would be beyond the borders of the 
Serbian state (the borders of the former Republic). In addition, the status of about two million 
Albanians in Kosovo (in the Republic of Serbia) would draw international attention in any 
reorganization along national-ethnic lines. In this case, if the Serbs in the Republics of (the future 
states of) Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia relied on self-determination to separate and join Serbia, 
Serbia would face the question of the status of the Kosovo and Sandzak regions where Muslims were 
the dominant popUlation and the status of the (former) Autonomous Province of Vojvodina which 
had a mixed population. 
In spite of the political, national and economic interests in preserving, decentralizing, and 
democratizing the state, that is, cooperation, the Federation-Serbian coalition did not have any 
confidence that the Slovenian-Croatian coalition wanted to remain in even a reformed common state 
of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it had no guarantee that the Siovenian-Croatian coalition would not 
secede even in the event of further decentralization and democratization of the federal state. 
In these circumstances, the best solution for the Federation-Serbian coalition was to adopt the 
strategy of centralization and to eliminate or curtail the capacity of the coalition of Slovenia and 
Croatia to secede. 
This strategy would remove the threat to the territorial integrity of the state and avoid the 
problem of pan-Yugoslavian Serbian nationality and the problem of non-Serbian nationalities within 
Serbia. Relative to the Slovenian-Croatian strategy of secession, it would lead the Federation-
Serbian coalition into conflict. 
Since each side loses more in conflict than in cooperation, as rational participants they should 
cooperate. Both the Siovenian-Croatian and the Federation-Serbian coalitions should realize they 
must agree to preserve the state and change the economic and political regime. But despite 
21
Basic: International Law and Security Dilemmas in Multiethnic States
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
22 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 8:1 
mistrust between participants leads them into conflict, the worst possible 
outcome.60 
Because of the lack of mutual confidence and the conviction that the 
international community will support principles of international law, each 
participant accepts inevitable conflict rather than risk greater loss from 
foolish cooperation.61 In this circumstance, each participant chooses its 
cooperation being a better common strategy than confrontation and conflict, each side decided upon 
a strategy that resulted in conflict. The Slovenian-Croatian coalition decided upon secession, and the 
Federation-Serbian coalition decided upon re-centralization. The combination resulted in conflict. 
60. Why, considering that the payoffs for cooperation are better than those for conflict, did the 
participants in the Yugoslav crisis choose strategies that resulted in conflict rather those that 
produced cooperation? Why were the strategies of re-centralization and secession the chosen 
strategies in the Yugoslav crisis? Both participants in the crisis were rational decision makers; they 
correctly calculated their interests and knew how to accomplish them. One of the main reasons for 
deciding against strategies that would lead to cooperation was the undefined relationship between 
the norms of the international legal system that added to the lack of mutual confidence and trust of 
each participant that the international community would protect its self-interest: secession or the 
territorial integrity of the state. Although each participant was tempted to try to negotiate their 
differences within Yugoslavia, it would not do so since it could not be certain the other would not 
forsake cooperation, and each believed that the international community would support its own self-
interest as a lawful claim in accordance with the norms of international law. This resulted in the 
worst possible outcome: armed conflict. Politically, Slovenian-Croatian and Federation-Serbian 
authorities had mutual contacts and theoretically could have negotiated confidence-building 
measures and then a cooperative agreement for the realization of their interests within a preserved 
Yugoslavia, but they did not do so, and their mutual distrust led them to reject cooperation and 
preservation of an intact Yugoslavia as a rational option. The international legal context was 
ambiguous in the Yugoslav crisis, and this contributed significantly and, in the author's view, 
definitively, to the progressive deterioration of mutual confidence and to decisions that resulted in 
conflict. 
61. From the points of view of the Slovenian-Croatian and Federation-Serbian coalitions the 
most important factors in the international context were the relations between principles of self-
determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of the state. The coalitions had to consider how 
the international community would react to their respective positions and decisions in light of these 
principles as the crisis evolved. The conflict in the relationship of the principles deepened the 
uncertainty of each coalition as to the behavior and motives of the other. Each presumed which 
principle of international law, the self-determination of peoples including secession, or preservation 
of the territorial integrity of the state, the international community would recognize. This 
presumption made a great difference, for two reasons. First and foremost, it contributed decisively to 
the mutual calculation not to cooperate. The ambiguity of the international reaction made it that 
much easier to believe the other coalition would forsake cooperation. This is due to the second 
reason. If the international community were to come down on the side of self-determination, this 
would support secession and strengthen the Sloven ian-Croatian position against that of the 
Federation-Serbian. If, on the other hand, external states were to support the preservation of the 
Yugoslavian state, that would strengthen the Federation-Serbian coalition's position relative to that 
of the Slovenian-Croatian. 
If centralized control were to be abandoned and the state were to disintegrate, Serbia would be in 
a difficult situation. The Federation-Serbian coalition would disintegrate since the Federal state 
apparatus would disappear. Serbia would be on its own and would face several problems. As 
discussed, Serbs would be national minorities in neighboring states, and Serbia would have to 
contend with the problem of national minorities within Serbia. If the international community were 
to follow through on the policy that condoned dissolution of Yugoslavia, then these national 
minorities would also have to be recognized as states or given a good deal of autonomy. The 
Federation-Serbian coalition would not only lose the advantages of being part of Yugoslavia, but 
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dominant strategy: secession for sub-national groups and centralization for 
central governments, believing that will achieve the best possible result. 
Each party can claim its desire is legitimate under international law. Self-
determination is legal and contributes to international peace, but so does 
respect for the territorial integrity of a state. Both participants can invoke 
legal authority for their respective positions and each is increasingly 
convinced that it is right and that the other participant threatens the 
achievement of its goal. In this situation principles of international law, 
self-determination of people and territorial integrity of states, in conjunction 
with principles of non-intervention and recognition of states, inevitably lead 
participants into conflict.62 
would have serious internal problems in a rump Serbian state. As a former nation and Republic in 
Yugoslavia, Montenegro would become an independent state. Serbia would then be land-locked, 
and might lose its access to the Adriatic coast and to the Mediterranean basin through Montenegro. 
In addition, as a result of the national minority problem within Serbia, it would lose control or would 
have restricted access to resources in Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
In terms of international law, the secession of the Republics represented the worst possible 
outcome for the Federation-Serbian coalition. The best outcome for the coalition resulted from 
eliminating or curtailing the possibilities of Slovenian-Croatian secession, thus discouraging the 
secession of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro and the 
disadvantageous independence or autonomy of the Autonomous Provinces. But this re-
centralization would lead to conflict with Slovenia and Croatia since they knew that coalition would 
neither accept them, nor believe them if they said they would preserve the state but reform the 
political, constitutional and economic regime. With conflict, the outcome was worse than the 
strategy of democratization and decentralization resulting in cooperation would have been. While 
conflict is worse than cooperation, it was better than the ultimate outcome if Slovenia-Croatia 
abandoned cooperation to reform the regime and that resulted in secession and dissolution of the 
state. In those circumstances, both coalitions should choose strategies that result in cooperation, but 
as discussed, that requires mutual confidence, which they lacked. Since both sides considered their 
options in an international context, each became cenain it could not count on the cooperation of the 
other. In light of the conflict in the relationship between the principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity, the absence of an unambiguous approach by the international community, and 
the predictability of the international reaction, re-centralization appeared to be the rational policy for 
the Federation-Serbian coalition. 
Like the Federation-Serbian coalition, the Slovenian-Croatian coalition was reluctant to 
cooperate. Based on lack of mutual confidence, each coalition accepted inevitable conflict rather 
than risk a greater loss from foolish cooperation. Internal historical, political, constitutional, and 
economic relations contributed to this decision, but ambiguity in the international legal order 
supported and deepened each side's suspicions. 
Regardless of what the other coalition decided, by accepting conflict each coalition believed it 
not only protected itself against the worse possible outcome, it also denied the other side its best 
possible outcome. The crisis could not be resolved by negotiating a change of regime within 
Yugoslavia; Slovenia-Croatia and the Federation-Serbia each had to avoid the respective risk of 
domination and dissolution and adopt policies that prevented the other from achieving the most 
damaging outcome. Believing cooperation was impossible, the crisis was resolved by conflict. In an 
ironic but tragic effort to deny each other its goal, conflict would result in either independence or 
domination. 
62. Nedzad Basic et ai, International Legal Order and Minority-Government Conflict, in 
MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE NEW EUROPE 288-91 (Cumper & Wheatley eds., 1999). 
23
Basic: International Law and Security Dilemmas in Multiethnic States
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
24 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 8:1 
IV. THE RIGHT OF SECESSION AND THE RATIONALITY OF 
COOPERATION 
While neither sub-national groups nor central governments can predict from 
contemporary international law whether the international community will 
exclude self-determination or territorial integrity, the resulting armed 
conflict prevents any chance for state-wide respect for democratization and 
human rights. Ironically, current international law directly contributes to 
this situation.63 
63. The fonnal logic of the model of the Current II!ternational Legal Order indicates that the 
Federal-Serbian coalition knew that threat of force would not maintain the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia. Similarly, Slovenia and Croatia knew that failure to accept re-centralization would not 
preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. The central question this analysis poses is why each 
coalition chose strategies--re-centralization at the Federal-Serbian level and independence at the 
Republican level--it knew would involve the threat and use of force. Why did one coalition decide 
upon force knowing it would provoke the disintegration of the state it sought to preserve? Why did 
the other decide to provoke the threat and necessitate a response in kind when that would make 
independence more costly to achieve than would negotiation? 
These choices reflected the mutual lack of the confidence necessary to choose strategies that 
would result in cooperation to resolve the crisis. The answer to why the perceived solution in those 
circumstances was to accept the counter-productive use of force lies in an understanding of the 
relationship between the international legal order and the behavior of the international community to 
the thinking of the participants in the crisis. The Federal-Serbian coalition realized that Slovenia and 
Croatia might not remain in Yugoslavia even if it agreed to some degree of democratization and 
decentralization. If it were to agree to decentralize, and Slovenia and Croatia were to secede anyway, 
it would have to accept the worst possible outcome--Slovenian and Croatian independence and the 
loss of a Serbian controlled Federal state. In that case, re-centralization, even though it would lead 
to conflict because Slovenia and' Croatia would decide to secede anyway, appeared to be the rational 
decision. But the attitude of the international community toward the position of the parties in the -
crisis encouraged the Federal-Serbian coalition in its decision to threaten and use force. The first 
phase of the conflict in Yugoslavia confinned that thinking. The international community rejected 
the secession of the Republics, Slovenia and Croatia in particular, and regarded the crisis as an 
internal Yugoslavian matter in which it would not intervene. This attitude confinned that conflict 
would not only resolve the crisis. but also that its outcome depended on the political and military 
power of the Federal-Serbian forces relative to that of the Slovenian and the Croatian forces. The 
parties believed that the international community would recognize the result of the use of force. If 
the Federal-Serbian coalition had sufficient political and military power, it would resolve the crisis 
by preserving the state and giving Serbia a dominant position in the new re-centralized political, 
constitutional and economic structure, and the international community would accept this outcome. 
But the international community would likewise accept the outcome if the Slovenian-Croatian 
coalition prevailed through force. This would allow it, as well as the other Republics, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. to secede, and the international community would recognize 
them as new states. 
The combination of internal circumstances and the posture of the international community could 
only encourage and intensify the use of force and the ambitions it feeds. This situation affected both 
coalitions in an ironic manner. In the first phase of the conflict (the separation of Slovenia and 
Croatia), the incapacity of the Federal-Serbian coalition to preserve Yugoslavia contributed to the 
attitude that if separation of the Republics were the result, then the existing borders of the Republic 
of Serbia would not be acceptable; there would have to be a "Greater Serbia." On the other hand, 
one of the Republics that sought independence in the first place, once it saw that it could be 
accomplished, also sought to expand into a "Greater Croatia." The "ethnic cleansing" or genocide 
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If self-determination included secession, either as a variant or as a single 
option, that would challenge the principle of respect for the territorial 
integrity of a state as the cornerstone of the modem international state 
system. Movement toward recognition of a right to secession would 
produce huge internal problems. If the international community is inclined 
to recognize the process of internal dissolution of a state as a basis for the 
recognition of unilateral secession it must also recognize the risk to internal 
peace.64 If the international community accepts the position that self-
determination means self-government within a state, but not independence 
through secession, that would also provoke internal and international 
conflict. Giving governments a free hand to act against sub-national groups 
by denying them the right to secede gives governments opportunities to 
refuse democratization and to violate the human rights of sub-national 
groupS.65 In these circumstances, the international community could not 
intervene to improve democratization or prevent human rights violations. 
Whichever position it adopts, the international community confronts the 
same consequences: increasing internal disorder and human rights 
violations. In considering a new international legal and political order, the 
main question is how the international community can employ the right of 
self-determination of peoples, including the right to secession, to prevent 
multi-ethnic conflict, while providing new opportunities for governments to 
preserve their territorial integrity. The two principles might possibly be 
brought together by focusing the attention of the parties on internal 
democratization, development, and respect for the highest standards of 
human rights.66 
In attempting to remedy so confused a situation in international law, the 
author proposes a change in the relationship between the self-interested 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity of states by 
that both ventures required, since newly acquired territory would have to be entirely Serbian or 
Croatian or Bosnaks, testifies to the extremes to which the use of force can lead. When it became 
clear that its strategy of re-centralization would not be successful, the Federal-Serbian coalition 
sought greater gain on the basis of a resolution along the original lines of conflict-preservation and 
re-centralization of Yugoslavia or independence of the Republics with its existing borders respected. 
It saw the opportunity to reduce its losses through expansion. On the other hand, Croatia, realizing it 
would get its original goal of independence, also sought to increase its gains through expansion. 
64. "So long as this clash between claims for the right to self-determination and insistence on 
state sovereignty persists, an intractable impasse will remain. Without a solution based on law, we 
are practically back to when the issue was settled by force. Obviously, this is not satisfactory." 
Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 37. 
65. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS (Clarendon Press 1988). 
66. Nedzad Basic et aI., The Right of Secession as a Tool to Protect the Territorial Integrity of 
State, 491NT'LPRoBS. 453 (n.4 1997). 
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introducing a new relationship between these international legal principles 
in which the international community respects both. 
What change in the relationship between these international law principles 
could achieve this goal? The competing self-interests of ethnic groups and 
central governments primarily focused on land issues (secession of sub-
national groups and the territorial integrity of a state) can only be achieved 
if democratization, development, and peace are respected. Changing the 
strategies of both participants would transform the conflict between legal 
principles of self-determination and territorial integrity, thereby 
transforming the outcomes for both sub-national groups and central 
governments. 
By introducing a new relationship between these principles of international 
law, the parties must consider that neither self-determination nor territorial 
integrity can be achieved without respect for human rights, development, 
and peace, and must adopt strategies that result in democratization but not 
necessarily in cooperation. This would effectively reduce the likelihood of 
armed conflict. 
If central governments and ethnic groups are given to understand that 
protection of territorial integrity of states and independence of ethnic 
groups can only be realized if human rights, peace, and development are 
respected, then the conflict is not about land but rather about how each can 
attain its goals within a context of observation of human rights, peace, and 
development, which leads to democratization. 
Thus, if a central government adopts measures of decentralization 
(constitutional, political, administrative) and democratization, while the 
sub-national groups seeks secession and disintegration of the state, the 
international community should not recognize the right of sub-national 
groups to secede. By realizing that a policy of conflict is self-defeating, 
even if the central government adopts a strategy of centralization, a sub-
national group may understand that it is better to adopt a strategy of 
democratization than a strategy of conflict, since only then can it obtain the 
best outcome, independence, as opposed to the worst outcome, remaining 
in the centralized state. The same logic applies to central governments. By 
realizing that a policy of conflict is self-defeating, even if a sub-national 
group adopts a strategy of secession, a central government may understand 
that it is better to adopt a strategy of decentralization and democratization 
than a strategy of centralization and conflict, since only then can it obtain 
the best possible outcome, preserving territorial integrity, as opposed to the 
worst possible outcome, disintegration of the state. 
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This has two effects: since observation of democratization and human 
rights affects the achievement of either or both principles of self-
determination or territorial integrity, democratization becomes the focal 
point and the active factor in resolving internal conflict and establishing 
internal and external peace.67 The other effect is that the international 
community will not stand aside and allow force to proceed; rather, it will 
use observation of democratization and human rights as the legal basis of 
intervention in the internal affairs of a state.68 
In a new international legal system, central governments and minority 
groups are in the same position. Whatever the sub-national group or 
central government decides, each can attain its best possible outcome 
only if it adopts policies of cooperation, decentralization, and 
democratization rather than pursuing strategies of centralization or 
secession.69 
In this new international legal system each participant, sub-national 
group or central government, will be either closer to or further from the 
achievement of its self-interest, to be independent or to protect the 
territorial integrity of the state, depending on whether it offers: a) a 
67. Assuming these changes in the case study of Yugoslavia, each coalition would realize that 
neither could achieve its self-interest if it violated human rights. Slovenia and Croatia could not 
secede if that led to human rights violations; likewise, Federal and Serbian authorities could not 
attempt to preserve Yugoslavia and re-centralize the regime that led to violations of human rights. 
Thus, since the threat and use of force results in human rights violations, and since each side knows 
that the other must respect human rights, the change in the international legal and political order 
would have precluded the use of force in the resolution of the Yugoslavian crisis. 
The change in the relationship between the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity and the watchfulness of the international community over each coalition's observation of 
human rights also addresses the problem of mutual lack of confidence. The Federation-Serbian 
coalition would realize, as would the Slovenian-Croatian coalition, that it could not adopt a strategy 
that resulted in conflict. This would eliminate the options of forceful re-centralization and secession, 
which together result in conflict, and leave only democratization. The Federal-Serbian coalition 
would have confidence the Slovenian-Croatian coalition, regardless of its desire to separate as a 
solution, would not abandon democratization and use force to secede. The Slovenian-Croatian 
coalition would have confidence that the Federal-Serbian coalition, regardless of its desire to re-
centralize as a solution, would not abandon decentralization and democratization and use force to re-
centralize. 
68. "[The 1 thesis defended here is that the rights of states recognised by international law are 
derived from human rights, and that as a consequence war on behalf of human rights (humanitarian 
intervention) is morally justified in appropriate case." FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 314 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1997). 
69. The posture of the international community woyld guarantee this. The Federal-Serbian 
coalition would know the international community would not tolerate the forcible secession of 
Slovenia and Croatia and that it would respect its right to maintain the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia. Similarly, Slovenia and Croatia would know that the international community would 
not tolerate the forcible preservation of territorial integrity through re-centralization and that it would 
recognize their right to self-determination. Democratization to realise the interests of each other 
would be the meeting point or fulcrum between the two coalitions. 
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higher or lower level of democratization; b) a higher or lower respect for 
human rights and freedom; c) a better or worse prosperity for its own 
people; d) a better or worse future for minority groups; e) a higher or 
lower degree of implementation of its own political program; and f) a 
higher or lower degree of persuasiveness that it is capable of carrying out 
its proposals. 
In this new international legal system, state and ethnic leaders must 
gather around them prominent scholars, businessmen, and liberal 
politicians who will be the main guarantors of the creation and 
implementation of democratic programs of national development and 
democratization of ethnic communities. 
Through this change in the international legal system, the central 
governments and sub-national groups would be involved in a new 
conflict game in which it would be possible to implement the rights of 
protecting territorial integrity or of secession only through development, 
internal democratization, respect for peace and human rights, and 
minorities' rights and freedoms, not through mutual killing, devastation, 
and expUlsion of minority groups. 
But why in this model would the parties not abandon cooperation and end 
up in conflict as they do in the current intemationallegal system? 
Both parties will avoid strategies that could lead to conflict. As a rational 
participant, each party will avoid a strategy that could lead to the worst 
possible outcome. Thus, in theory and in practice, neither self-
determination (secession) nor the maintenance of territorial integrity should 
undermine the human rights of the the other participant.70 
70. Considering this in terms of the Yugoslav case study in which the central government is 
the Federal-Serbian coalition and the sub-national group is the Slovenian-Croatian coalition, if 
Slovenia and Croatia were to abandon cooperation and use force to secede, they would face the 
worst possible outcome: a re-centralized, Serbian dominated state. On the other hand, this is the best 
outcome for the Federal-Serbian coalition. Since the Slovenian and Croatian use of force would 
entail human rights abuses, the international community would permit re-centralization. The 
Slovenians and Croatians would know they must avoid re-centralization since they would lose any 
political and economic benefits they sought. So they would have to accept democratization, prevent 
the loss of benefits, and negotiate to gain the benefits they sought. If the Federal-Serbian coalition 
were to abandon decentralization and democratization and attempt to re-centralize through the use of 
force, it would face its worst possible outcome: the secession and recognition of Slovenia and 
Croatia. On the other hand, this would be the best possible outcome for Slovenia and Croatia. Since 
Federal-Serbian re-centralization would entail the use of force and human rights violations, the 
international community would permit the secession of Slovenia and Croatia and would recognize 
them as new states. Federal and Serbian leaders would know they must avoid Sloven ian and 
Croatian secession to prevent the loss of any political and economic benefits they sought. So they 
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The change in the relationship between the principles of self-determination 
and territorial integrity, and the watchfulness of the international 
community over each party's observation of human rights and peace, also 
addresses the problem of mutual lack of confidence. The central 
government and the sub-national group would each realize that it cannot 
adopt a strategy that results in conflict. This eliminates the options of 
centralization and secession, which together result in conflict. Neither can 
abandon democratization, thus eliminating the dilemma caused by thinking 
the other will abandon mutual collaboration. The central government 
would have confidence that the sub-national group, regardless of its desire 
and its right to separate, would not abandon democratization and use force 
to secede. The sub-national group would have confidence that the central 
government, regardless of its desire to centralize and its right to protect its 
territorial integrity, would not abandon democratization and use force to 
centralize. 
These proposed changes in the international legal system would guarantee 
this outcome. The central government would know that the sub-national 
group has no interest in employing violent secession, and can be confident 
that the international community will not recognize violent secession of the 
sub-national group and will respect and support its right to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the state. Similarly, the sub-national group would 
know that the central government has no claim to centralization simply 
because the territorial integrity of the state can be maintained through 
decentralization and democratization, and can be confident that the 
international community will not tolerate the brutal preservation of 
territorial integrity through forceful centralization, and would recognize its 
right to self-determination, including the right to secession. 
Democratization would be the meeting point between the partlclpants. 
Since neither would jeopardize cooperation, that would eliminate the 
concern that the other party would abolish mutual collaboration, a concern 
that is currently enhanced by the conflict between the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity in the international legal order. 
Considering this in tenus of a new international legal system, if a sub-
national group were to abandon democratization and use force to secede, it 
would face the worst possible outcome. Since the use of force would entail 
human rights and peace abuses, the international community would support 
centralization of the state and protect human rights. The minority group 
would have to accept decentralization and democratization, prevent the loss of benefits, and 
negotiate to gain the benefits they sought. 
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would know it must avoid centralization of the state since it would lose any 
political and economic benefits sought. It would accept democratization 
and prevent the loss of benefits, including the right of secession. 
If the central government abandons democratization and attempts to 
centralize through the use of force, it faces the worst possible outcome. 
Since this would entail the use of force and violations of human rights and 
peace, the international community would permit and support secession of 
the sub-national group and would recognize new states. A central 
government would know it must avoid secession of sub-national groups, so 
it would accept decentralization and democratization and prevent the loss of 
its territory. 
These changes in the international legal order would give both participants 
clear rules of international law and unambiguous obligations to the 
international community, and so support and deepen their trust of each 
other, leading to an elimination of their dilemma. 
Thus, the conflict between sub-national groups and central governments 
would shift from territorial questions to issues of development and 
democracy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In a new international legal system, the relationship between principles of 
self-determination and territorial integrity of states, associated with 
principles of humanitarian intervention and international recognition of new 
states, should promote the peaceful resolution of disputes and the internal 
democratization of multiethnic states if their application is governed by 
adherence to international human rights, development, and principles of 
peace. 
This position implies that if the right of self-determination were limited to 
self-governance within a state, the principle of self-determination would 
itself reduce pressure for internal democratization and thus eliminate it as 
an inherent force of internal democratization. On the other hand, a people 
who seek self-determination should also have to respect and develop the 
highest standards of human rights, peace, and development. Similarly, if 
they do not, they should be obligated to remain in the centralized state. 
This implies that self-determination cannot grant an immediate and 
unconditional right to secede. If a people has a right to secede without 
having to observe human rights, peace, and development while they are in 
the state, then equally, there is no inherent pressure on them to do so, and 
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any overtures toward internal improvement through democratization, 
including respect for human rights, peace, and development, can be easily 
rejected. Protecting territorial integrity without obliging the government to 
respect human rights, peace, and development, and allowing secession 
without a previous obligation to observe human rights, peace and 
development have the same consequence: the state descends deeper into 
autocracy and retreats further from democracy as all parties resort to force 
to settle issues that quickly become, if they are not already, scores. 
Without the right of secession of sub-national groups the central 
government is not under any inherent pressure to compromise and 
democratize. Sub-national groups, knowing this, will also be reluctant to 
compromise and accept any promises of internal reform. If, on the other 
hand, international law were to recognize an unconditional right of 
secession, sub-national groups would have no motive to cooperate in 
internal reform and progressive development of respect for human rights, 
peace, and development. By recognizing the right of secession of sub-
national groups and holding the possibility of secession open, the primary 
responsibility of international law and of the international community in 
these cases is to create non-violent democratic routes for achieving self-
determination that encourage and develop respect for human rights, peace, 
and development. The international community can use international law 
to gradually reduce the inherent conflict between self-determination and 
territorial integrity, as the use of these principles in light of the forces of 
democratization and respect for human rights, peace, and development, 
makes the parties view them as less and less irreconcilable. 
Moreover, if self-determination excludes secession as an international legal 
norm, the conflict remains within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The 
international community has no legal basis to intervene unless the conflict 
jeopardizes international peace. Meanwhile, conflict often provokes human 
rights violations and extensive social, political, and economic destruction. 
Although the international community has made self-determination into a 
jus cogens norm of international law?' and has developed international 
human rights law, neither is able to deal with the most prevalent threat to 
peace.72 
71. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 133-40. 
72. "Considerable human rights efforts have been expended in recent years to establish free 
elections and to achieve political rights by instituting democratic electoral processes. For the most 
part, insufficient attention has been paid to protecting human rights once a freely-elected government 
is in place." Dinah Shelton, Challenges to the Future of Civil and Political Rights, SS WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1998). 
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The international community will assess the policies and actions of each 
party against their respect for human rights. It will allow secession if the 
central government fails to respect human rights, peace, and development. 
Similarly, the group seeking self-determination must not use force and must 
not violate human rights; otherwise, the international community will 
respect the state's territorial integrity against the group's desire to secede. 
Assessment against a human rights standard produces competition between 
the parties to outperform the other. 
If a central government wants to preserve the territorial integrity of a 
state, it will develop a program for the development of human rights 
standards, peace, and development. This will encourage the group 
seeking self-determination to initiate or improve performance in this 
regard. 
Through these chain reactions, the desire to preserve the state's territorial 
integrity and the desire to realize independence work to produce a 
guarantee of human rights, peace, and development for all. As both parties 
engage in human rights activities to retain their respective principles, the 
joint focus on human rights becomes a trend toward peace, 
democratization, and development. In the end, the principles of self-
determination, territorial integrity, and human rights harmonize rather than 
conflict. Influenced by this new constellation of international legal order, 
the parties' political interests gradually refocus away from territorial issues 
and toward the all-important process of democratization. 
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